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Abstract  Before rural local government units were established in Thailand, reform 
debates within the country faced a crucial issue: Candidates at the rural sub-district 
levels might adopt electioneering methods such as vote buying and the patronage 
system of the local political and economic elite, the methods that had been used  in 
the national elections. In fact, the results of the 2006 survey in this paper, which 
followed the introduction of direct elections in rural local government units in 2003, 
contrast with the result anticipated during the debates on political reform. The 
preliminary data of the survey shows that the decentralization process and the 
introduction of the direct election system in the rural areas had some effect in 
changing the selection process of the local elite in Thailand.  
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Introduction 
 Under the political reform aimed at decentralization, which occurred between 1995 and 1997, 
over 6,000 new local governments were formed in Thai rural areas. This development brought 
democratic politics to rural inhabitants who hitherto had been limited in their participation in 
and right to vote for the local government. Under the former system, between 1932 and 1994, 
large- and medium-sized local government units (local administrative organizations, LAOs) 
were largely confined to urban and quasi-urban areas(less than 300 units), and in the rural 
districts, there were only administrative bodies like villages and Tambon Administration 
Organizations (TAOs). However, between 1994 and 1997, more than 6,616 rural units were 
created, and most of them were small-sized LAOs with a population scale of about 5,000–
15,000 inhabitants. The creation of small-sized LAOs gave rise to both beneficial and 
problematic features.  
So far as the advantages were concerned, the small size of LAOs meant that administration 
was brought within easy reach of the voters, and when elections were held, they took place 
within units small enough to facilitate democratic competition among the candidates. In that 
sense, small units were appropriate for helping local residents to elect their desired leaders.  
 On the other hand, a disadvantage was that the reform intensified the conspicuous contrast in 
the resource endowment between rural and urban LAOs in Thailand. In the case of LAOs in 
rural areas, their fragmentation into units of a very small size led to difficulties in budgetary 
spending and use of manpower (the average number of personnel in TAOs is only 15). In 
such cases, an increase in the transfer of administrative tasks meant that local governments 
faced nothing but difficulties stemming from a lack of resources, which in turn led to 
inefficiencies in the conduct of administration. It was with the aim of rectifying this resource 
deficiency that the Thai authorities planned to enhance the efficiency of the administrative 
systems by introducing direct elections, which were meant to increase the power of local 
presidents (Kowit 2005). Local governments were created on the assumption that local 
leaders would play a key role in the structure of the administrative system. They functioned as 
agents delegated by the people to promote local development and carry out efficient 
administration. Bearing in mind that there are socio-economic differences between urban and 
rural LAOs in Thailand, this paper clarifies the attributes and behavior of the local 
government presidents, who are key players in the conduct of local public administration in 
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Thailand. In particular, it takes into account the influence of both the election system and the 
system of administration.  
1. Background to the decentralization of Thailand’s local government: Creation of rural 
local government units and procedures for direct elections 
 The decentralization of local government in Thailand formed part of the state’s restructuring 
schemes, which was the aim of the new constitution introduced in 1997. Legal specialists and 
political scientists of Thammasat University put together a proposal for decentralization 
(Nagai 2008). These intellectuals did not belong to the bureaucracy and acted independently 
without reference to the intentions of the Ministry of Interior or members of the Thai 
parliament. During the 1990s, while intellectuals were strongly promoting the idea of 
decentralization to rural areas, democratization was becoming an increasingly important issue, 
as were political antagonisms between rural and urban areas and the gap in economic 
development between the cities and the countryside.  
 From 1992 to 2006, once the country had stabilized following a military coup d’état, the 
holding of elections at regular intervals became a possibility. In fact, up to the 1980s, 
Thailand relied on coups to initiate changes in the government, and those who assumed 
control at the center of the political administration were Bangkok-based elite, comprising men 
with a military background and highly educated technocrats.  They acted independently from 
the wishes of the provincial population and members of parliament. Administrations of this 
kind, whose main distinguishing feature is the concentration of power at the center, have been 
described as “bureaucratic polity regimes.”  
 The upshot was that investment and economic functions became concentrated within the 
single geographical pole of Bangkok and its peripheries, a process that led to an unrestricted 
form of regionally distorted economic development. This situation continued unchanged into 
the period of democratization. 
 Nevertheless, with the withdrawal of military intervention since 1992 to 2006, national 
elections began to be held, and from the mid-1990s onward, there emerged a marked 
difference in political intentions between the rural population, which constituted the great 
majority in Thailand, and their urban counterpart. Against the background of intensifying 
regional inequality, so far as investment and development were concerned, rural voters, and 
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especially those in the north and northeast, began to demand a greater share in the allocation 
of development funds (Anek 1996). 
 On the one hand, the decentralization of local government, which was pushed forward in this 
context, can be seen as a revolutionary reform that conferred on the rural population a new 
right of self-determination as well as a fairer share of the resources allocated to economic 
development. But on the other hand, the intellectuals who conceived the reform found it 
necessary to make compromises with conservative forces in the bureaucracy and with the 
urban population. There are three noteworthy concessions that had to be made.  
 First, the bureaucrats (particularly those in the main ministries) and the urban population 
were deeply suspicious of the growth of local government capabilities in the countryside. For 
decentralization to go ahead despite this suspicion, a gradualist approach, especially in the 
distribution of resources had to be adopted.  
 Second, the accountability of local government management had to be increased. To achieve 
this aim, the Interior Ministry carried out the selection and dispatching of the head clerk 
(“palad” in Thai) whose academic background was believed sufficient to conduct local 
government office procedures. For appointment to the post of local government president, 
eligibility requirements were also based on educational attainment (as the clearest 
qualification) to retain the trust of the bureaucrats and the city dwellers.  
 Third, to deter local businessmen and members of parliament from making open attempts to 
take over the new rural vote, the central bureaucracy gave priority to setting up a standing 
committee known as the Decentralization Committee in the Office of Prime Minister. The 
Committee is an independent body mainly consisting of intellectuals that implemented 
principles for budget allocations and that, among other things, managed decentralization 
policy. 
 After completion of the political process whereby the consent of the bureaucrats and the 
urban population was achieved, and following the introduction of the 1997 constitution and 
the legislative measures of 1999, the experiment in fostering grass-roots democratization in 
the regions got underway. In the countryside, 6,000 small local government units (known as 
Tambon Administrative Organization, TAOs) were established.  
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So far as systems were concerned, the decentralization reforms placed high hopes on the 
constructive role of local government leadership. Moreover, it was in this context that election 
systems and business management systems were established. In other words, leaders who 
were delegated by the people by way of direct elections to carry out local development may 
have been subject to strict control from the central authorities (Note 1), but at the same time 
they were vouchsafed a stable position (that of a “strong executive”) vis-à-vis local 
government councils. For example, (1)under the Thai local government system, local councils 
are not authorized to recall their local government president. Instead, the people are given the 
right to remove a local government president through the Interior Ministry. (2)The 
appointment of the president’s executive assistants does not require the local council’s 
permission, and (3) the right to issue ordinances and budget proposals to the local council is 
vested in the president and his executive assistants. 
Moreover, (4) about the amount and use of budgetary funds, the requirement for presidents to 
submit a report to the Interior Ministry is limited to only part of the budget (general aid funds). 
Also, even though the total amount of the budgetary funds may be small, the system allows 
the president substantial room and discretion in planning his budgetary expenditure. Put 
differently, among the local governments of Thailand, which receive small amounts of 
resources that are further subdivided through budget making, resource shortages can be made 
good at the discretion of presidents. In addition, if presidents prove to be capable executive 
officers, local government business can be conducted with an efficient use of manpower and 
money. In summary, the system relies much on the ability of individual local government 
presidents. 
 In this way, a highly Thai-style view of leadership —a view that stresses competence of 
individuals—(see Shigetomi [2002]) gave insufficient attention to basic problems, such as the 
difficulties confronting the executive and the differences between rural and urban local 
governments. In other words, in contrast with the strong intervention of the central authorities 
in controlling the entry of candidates into the election process, there has been little attempt to 
monitor the running of local governments once presidents have been elected. The 
fundamental problem of how to achieve equality in the distribution of resources across many 
extremely small LAOs is the basic shortcoming of the decentralization reform, one whose 
solution continues to be postponed.  
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 In what follows, with the peculiarities of the institutional arrangements providing the context, 
this paper comments on the analysis results of statistical data collected in 2006. These results 
help clarify the impact of direct elections on Thailand rural local government since 2003, and 
cast light on the executive system that centers on the administrative activities of local 
government presidents. 
II Election system: Emergence of newcomer presidents and their attributes 
 Based on survey data related to rural and urban LAOs in Thailand collected in 2006, this 
section clarifies the influence of direct elections on local government leadership. The survey 
on local government was the first large-scale investigation of its kind in Thailand and jointly 
conducted by the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan, and Thammasat University, 
Thailand. The survey relates to a particular time, and because no equivalent survey was 
conducted before 2003, when indirect elections were the rule, temporal comparison before 
and after introducing direct elections has been impossible. 
 However, of the 2,272 responses collected through the 2006 survey, some 267 came from 
LAOs whose leaders had been appointed prior to the 2003 transition to direct elections and 
whose administrations were being conducted with little change from the pre-2003 period. It 
has therefore been possible to make some comparison of conditions before and after the 
introduction of direct elections. 
Table 1 shows the career backgrounds of presidents at the time of their election, by rural and 
urban areas, and allows for a comparison of conditions before and after the shift to direct 
elections. According to the table, in urban LAOs, in which there was a long tradition of local 
administration and thanks to a long-standing familiarity with elections for local thesaban 
(Thesaban councils), the pre-election career backgrounds of presidents before and after the 
introduction of direct elections differed, albeit very little. However, in LAOs that had been 
recently created, the introduction of direct elections led to the emergence of newcomer 
presidents whose career backgrounds displayed a different pattern. Thus, whereas under 
indirect elections 29.6% presidents had been previously engaged in farming and 40.8% had 
been businessmen, under direct elections the proportion of former businessmen fell by over 
15.4%; the proportion of former farmers increased to 40.3% and that of former teachers to 
14.9%. In this paper,  author would name the individuals from the farming population and 
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from the teacher background as “new comer” presidents, while the those of former 
businessmen and ex-officials would be named as “old elite” presidents. 
 
Table １  Occupations of President by Direct－Indirect Election (%)  
 
Businees 
Owner. 
Private 
Employee 
Farmer Teacher 
Ex 
Official 
Other Total 
 
Direct 
Election 
 
Urban 
LAOs 
49.2 3.3 13.4 13.8 4.4 15.8 
100.0 
(N=246) 
Rural 
LAOs 
22.1 3.8 44.1 14.9 4.6 10.5 
100.0 
(N=1759) 
 Total 25.4 3.7 40.3 14.8 4.6 11.2 
100.0 
(N=2005) 
Indirect 
Election 
Urban 
LAOs 
50.0 0.0 18.3 11.5 5.7 14.4 
100.0 
(N=104) 
Rural 
LAOs 
35.0 7.4 36.8 8.0 3.7 9.2 
100.0 
(N=163) 
 Total 40.8 4.5 29.6 9.4 4.5 11.2 
100.0 
(N=267) 
Source: Calculated from the 2006 Survey. 
Insofar as the origins of local government presidents are concerned, the figures clearly show 
that under the direct election system, an elite class composed of former businessmen and ex-
bureaucrats was replaced by individuals from a different social class. 
Table 2  selects data of presidents only from the direct election system and shows the 
educational backgrounds and former occupations of such individuals. According to the table, 
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as for the educational backgrounds of those who were formerly engaged in agriculture (the 
most numerous category), over 80% had been educated to the high school and junior college 
level. In the case of presidents who had formerly been employed in the teaching profession, 
because a graduate certificate is necessary to obtain a teaching license, some 60% were 
graduates. By contrast, among the presidents who had been businessmen and bureaucrats,  
40% or more had academic qualifications that were superior to the basic education certificate, 
and the average number of years spent in education was far greater than in the case of those 
who had come from a farming background (Note 2). 
Table２ Educational Backgrounds of President from Direct Election by Occupation (%) 
 
  
Primary & 
Lower  
Secondary 
Upper 
Secondary 
&Diploma 
Bachelor 
Degree or 
Higher 
Total 
Business Owner(N=545) 14.3 48.4 37.2 100.0 
Private Employee (N=75) 4.0 45.3 50.7 100.0 
Farmer  (N=817) 25.0 62.3 12.7 100.0 
Teacher or Professor  
(N=298) 8.1 32.6 59.4 100.0 
Ex official(N=96) 10.4 42.7 46.9 100.0 
Other (N=232) 16.8 50.9 32.3 100.0 
Total (N=2063) 17.3 50.7 32.0 100.0 
X2 =265.68    p.< 0.001   
Source Calculated from the2006 Survey. 
 
 From these results, we see that as far as rural local governments are concerned (as distinct 
from urban units), the introduction of direct elections exerted a profound effect on the 
appointment of local government presidents. In fact, the reality from the data is at odds with 
the “ideal situation” that was hoped for by the Ministry of Interior, which envisaged the 
election of well-educated presidents. A  feature contrary to the standards that the bureaucrats 
tried to apply was that rural voters tended to elect presidents who had the bare minimum 
academic qualifications required for appointment to the post. In this way, insofar as the 
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exercise of the democratic entitlement of the rural population was at odds with the 
expectations of the Ministry of Interior, the emergence of the newcomer presidents marked 
the beginnings of an important change in the selection process of Thailand’s local political 
leaders. 
 Moreover, the background of the individuals elected to presidential office, in both rural and 
urban areas, often included local managerial experience in service to the community, rather 
than the high levels of educational attainment, which was initially insisted upon by central 
ministry bureaucrats and the urban population as a prerequisite for election to the post of 
president.  
When we investigate the previous career record of those elected to local presidential office, 
we find that over 70% of the respondents were either former theseban members (8.6%) or 
members of tambon assemblies (73.3 %), while 30% had served as chairpersons of tambon 
administrative districts (kamnan 12.9%, village headmen 19.5%). In fact, in rural districts, 
30% of presidents had formerly been involved in community service, as members of village 
assemblies (12.9%) or members of community organizations (17.9%). To summarize, many 
of those who were elected to the post of local government president had ongoing experience 
of various types of managerial activity at the local level. They were individuals who had won 
the trust of voters through long periods of community service or by way of service as 
members of local government councils. 
 
III Executive system: How do newcomer presidents try resolving problems? 
1. Attributes of presidents and local government performance 
 As for the reality of the emergence of newcomer presidents with their particular attributes, 
this section discusses its effects on the executive practices and administrative behavior of the 
new presidents appointed through direct elections. This section identifies the attributes and 
behavior patterns of presidents, both before and after the introduction of direct elections, in 
terms of a) the system variables of direct and indirect elections and b) the categorization of 
presidents’ former career backgrounds in terms of the “old elite” (presidents who had been 
businessmen and bureaucrats) and the “newcomers” (presidents whose career background was 
in farming and teaching). 
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 First, Tables 3 illustrate the states of resource distribution and the different indices of 
performance between rural and urban LAOs.   
Table3  Differenciated Resource Distribution between Urban-Rural LAOs  
with reference to Presidents academic backgrounds 
 
 
 
 
Total Budget 
per 
population** 
Special Grant 
per 
population** 
Self- 
collected 
Budget per 
population** 
No of 
Ordinances 
No of 
Prizes** 
Urban 
LAOs 
   
Primary& 
Lower Secondary 6133.96 181.28 153.09 1.09 1.00 
Upper secondary 
and Diploma 4892.74 296.14 163.42 2.09 1.07 
Higher education 5828.16 610.25 150.22 1.80 1.57 
 Total 5539.83 459.40 155.02 1.82 1.36 
Rural 
LAOs 
  
Primary& 
Lower Secondary 1533.89 83.31 42.62 1.85 0.76 
Upper secondary 
and Diploma 1540.13 76.83 41.48 1.68 0.81 
Higher education 1615.63 117.20 36.46 1.88 0.89 
  Total 1560.68 89.57 40.25 1.77 0.82 
* p< 0.05    **  p< 0.01 
Source: calculated from the 2006 Survey. 
Note: The data on Budget is from the 2003 data.  
 
 Among urban and local governments in Thailand, budgetary allocations to urban local 
government units outstrip those to rural government units by a substantial margin. Moreover, 
in terms of the ordinances and awards passed by local councils, urban local governments 
surpass rural ones. However, there exists a budget category referred to as “special aid funds,” 
which at the discretion of the local government president, can be obtained through negotiation 
with the central authorities and members of parliament. Also, well-educated presidents of 
urban local government with a flair for statistical work can succeed in acquiring such funding. 
This difference in the present budget allocations might illustrate   distinctions in how urban 
and rural local government units (presidents) approach the task of problem solving in the 
course of their work.  
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2. Behavior patterns among presidents attempting to address budgetary income 
shortfalls: Success and failure of such attempts 
 In the overall behavior of local government presidents, actions related to obtaining all-
important financial resources might be analyzed in terms of presidents’ attributes, a task that 
is the focus of this section. 
 Tables 4 and 5 show, with respect to rural and urban local governments and concerning 
presidents appointed by both direct and indirect elections, the results of actual attempts by 
presidents to obtain financial aid by contacting heads of prefectural governments, regional 
politicians, and parliamentarians for budgetary assistance. The first point to note is that such 
appeals for budgetary help have been made very frequently. Between 70% and 80% of the 
presidents who responded to our survey confirmed that they had approached parliamentarians 
for assistance (link 6 in Figure 1 may not be a formal channel of communication, but in 
practice it is of great importance for supplying local presidents with aid). This type of action, 
aimed at acquiring budgetary funds and carried out through negotiation by political leaders, is 
recognized in Thailand as a legitimate part of the budgetary process. For example the “special 
aid fund,” which is distributed for political purposes to local governments by members of 
parliament and cabinet ministers, has in effect become a political framework for the typical 
local government budget (Note 3).  
Despite accusations of corruption and mutual back scratching among politicians and local 
government presidents, the practice  continues as part of the formal task of the local 
government presidents. In this regard, there is significant statistical evidence to show that 
centrally placed politicians, such as heads of prefectural governments (Table 4) and 
parliamentarians (Table 5), give more aid to presidents, who have been appointed by indirect 
elections and who function as regional bosses, than to presidents newly chosen by direct 
elections. The distribution of budgetary funds to local governments can be seen as one of the 
determinants whereby political settlements are agreed upon, using parliamentarians as 
intermediaries. 
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 Table4   Contact to ”President of Provincial Administration Organization” to ask for 
help on budget deficit by Direct―Indirect Election 
 
To whom to ask for help when 
budget is not enough 
(President of PAO)   
Total 
Got support Could not  get support 
Urban LAOs 
(N=225)* 
Presidents 
from Direct 
election 
68.9 31.1 100.0 (N=164) 
Presidents 
from Indirect 
election 
82.0 18.0 100.0 (N=61) 
Rural LAOs 
（N=1505） 
Presidents 
from Direct 
election 
83.5 16.5 100.0 
（N=1375） 
Presidents  
from Indirect 
election 
89.2 10.8 100.0 
（N=130） 
* p< 0.05      Source: calculated from the 2006 Survey 
 
 
Table 5  Contact to ”Members of Parliament ” to ask for help on budget deficit  
by Direct―Indirect Election 
 
 
To whom to ask for help when 
budget is not enough 
(President of PAO) Total  
Got support Could not get support 
Urban LAOs 
(N=205) 
Presidents 
from Direct 
Election 
75.0 25.0 100.0 (N=152) 
Presidents 
from Indirect 
election 
83.0 17.0 100.0 (N=53) 
Rural LAOs 
（N=1380） 
Presidents 
from Direct 
election 
79.1 20.9 100.0 
（N=1260） 
Presidents 
from Indirect 
election 
85.0 15.0 100.0 
（N=120） 
Source: calculated from the 2006 Survey 
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Next, and still on the topic of the behavior of presidents attempting to obtain budgetary funds, 
we compare presidents in terms of their attributes. As expected, presidents belonging to the 
old elite (businessmen and ex-officials) enjoy closer budgetary aid connections with 
parliamentarians and prefectural governors than do local government presidents appointed by 
direct elections (Tables 6 and 7). Nevertheless, newcomer rural presidents have closer 
budgetary aid connections with prefectural governors than newcomer urban presidents (Table 
7).  
Table 6   Contact to “Provincial Governor” to ask for help on budget deficit  
by President’s occupational background 
 
To whom to ask for help when 
budget is not enough 
(Members of Parliament) Total 
Got support Could not get support 
Urban LAOs 
(N=176) 
Old Elite 76.9 23.1 100.0 (N=117) 
New comer 79.7 20.3 100.0 (N=59) 
Rural LAOs 
(N=1288)** 
*
* 
Old Elite 
85.2 14.8 100.0 
（N=445） 
New comer 77.1 22.9 100.0 
（N=843） 
** p< 0.001     
Source Calculated from 2006 Survey 
 
Table 7 Contact to “Provincial Governor” to ask for help on budget deficit  
by President’s occupational background 
 
To whom to ask for help when 
budget is not enough 
(Provincial governor) Total  
 
Got support Could not get support\ 
Urban LAOs 
(N=144) 
Old Elite 68.7 31.3 100.0 (N=99) 
New comer 75.6 24.4 100.0 (N=45) 
Rural LAOs 
(N=987)** 
Old Elite** 78.6 21.4 100.0 
（N=359） 
New comer 69.7 30.3 100.0 
（N=628） 
** p< 0.001  
Source Calculated from 2006 Survey  
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 Many rural local government units in Thailand are extremely small in size, and this puts a 
premium on the efficiency of local government presidents and their ability to sustain personal 
relationships that are useful for their local government areas. 
Table 8 introduces the most important structural variables, namely explanatory ones relating 
to socio-economic elements relevant to the analysis of the functioning of the presidents of 
Thailand’s local governments, rural and urban. In this table, the R2 squared value of 0.48 
indicates the substantial explanatory strength of the model, but much of this stems from 
conclusions based on explanatory variables for all urban units, rural and urban. In addition, 
because the table deals with connections with parliamentarians and elements brought about by 
statistically significant differences between direct and indirect election systems, there are no 
differences related to the career backgrounds of local government presidents. Moreover, 
concerning connections between local government presidents and the executive branches of 
the ruling party, and the attributes of presidents (in terms of whether they belonged to the old 
elite), examples of statistically low indices exhibit a weak connection with per capita 
distribution of the budgetary allocation. 
Table8  Regression  analysis of 2003 Total budget per capita. 
 
 (6Variables→2003 Total budget per population）   
        
     Beta ｔ  Ｐ 
(Indipendent Variables)  25.22  0.00  
Years of Education of President 0.01  0.33  0.74  
Contact to Members of Parliament（Got 
support） 
-0.08  -4.04  0.00  
Contact to executive members of 
government party （Got support）） 0.04  1.80  0.07  
Urban LAOーRural LAO -0.66  -31.81  0.00  
Direct-Indirect Election 0.06  2.80  0.01  
Occupational background 0.04  1.89  0.06  
Dependent Variable: 2003budget per 
capita       
R2  0.48    
N=1330    
Source Caculated from the 2006  Survey。 
 
14 
 
 Again, if we further take into account the regression analysis of rural and urban local 
governments, the explanatory power of the model considerably weakens. But the two 
explanatory variables of connections with parliamentarians and method of election (direct or 
indirect) emerge as elements whose importance is clear in a large number of cases. To 
summarize, funds obtained by budget-related approaches to parliamentarians, even though 
they represent a very small proportion of the local authority budget, are seen by both rural and 
urban local governments as a significant element. Moreover, as for the acquisition of local 
government budgetary funds, in all cases it becomes clear that the career background of the 
presidents has no statistical significance. 
 
IV Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The results of the above analysis demonstrate the radical nature of the political changes that 
occurred in the rural areas of Thailand as an accompaniment to the introduction in 2003 of 
direct elections for local government presidents. In particular, as a result of these 
revolutionary changes in the sphere of local government and the transition from indirect 
elections to direct ones, rural voters turned from an old elite consisting of individuals with 
high levels of educational attainment (businessmen and former bureaucrats) to new presidents 
from farming or teaching backgrounds. However, the behavioral choices available to 
newcomer presidents for the solution of administrative problems considerably differed from 
those available to presidents who belonged to the old elite, that is, presidents appointed as the 
result of indirect elections.  
As the results of this survey make clear, presidents belonging to the old elite possessed 
“contact resources” in the form of access to administrative and political networks. In many 
cases, they enjoyed the possibility of activating helpful contacts for externally obtaining 
resources and acquiring supplementary funds for their budgets. For example, contacts with 
members of parliament, used in the statistical analysis as a variable reflecting the influence of 
contacts on budget distribution, demonstrate the possibility of obtaining an advantageous 
budget allocation, available to “old elite” presidents. 
On the other hand, some of the data show that, as for attempts to obtain budget funds, there 
was not much difference in the way in which the central administrative authorities (central 
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administration and prefectural governors) treated presidents belonging to the old elite and 
those who were newcomers. This being the case, a new type of policy problem comes to the 
surface, namely one that concerns the links between the election system and the 
administrative system in Thailand. Against the background of high hopes being vested by the 
central authorities in newly elected leaders, and the intention to place in office leaders of 
ability who would be skilled in cultivating personal relationships, the candidature of persons 
entering elections for the presidents of local government was strictly controlled from the 
center. This was done under the assumption that if better presidents were chosen (“better” in 
this context meaning more efficient), the new presidents would be able to administer their 
local government units ably and efficiently, despite the paucity of the resources available to 
them.  
In fact, as a result of the introduction of direct elections, the attributes of the presidents who 
were actually appointed differed somewhat from the outcome that had been envisaged by the 
Local Government Decentralization Committee and the Interior Ministry. In particular, when 
it came to using external networks to obtain resources and employing the help of 
parliamentarians to resolve problems, the farmers and the teachers who took up the job of 
president found themselves at a disadvantage relative to presidents who belonged to the old 
elite. 
Taking into account the realities of the behavioral choices available to presidents for 
obtaining budgetary resources and for resolving problems, a case can be made for a change of 
course among the central authorities away from the centralized control and administration of 
an election system that is the gateway to local government presidential posts. Put differently, 
what is needed is a system of government that will allow the local government presidents of 
Thailand a fairer distribution of resources and easier access to information and sources of 
assistance. 
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Summary 
Since the 1990s, the local economic elite had been consistently selected in national elections 
at the local levels and their dominance was a matter of central concern. Thus, it was believed 
that decentralization would result in the new local government executive members whose 
professional backgrounds would be occupied by business people under political influence of 
national politicians.  
However, the results of the 2006 survey, which followed the introduction of direct elections in 
rural LAOs in 2003, contrast with the result anticipated during the debates on political reform, 
that is, the former local elite with (their economic power and) business backgrounds would 
dominate after direct elections at the local governmental level.   In fact, the results of a 
transitional period from indirect to direct election show an observable increase in the 
proportion of presidents selected from the farming population and the teaching profession in 
many of the rural LAOs that made a shift from indirect to direct elections.  
The qualifications of “the newcomer presidents,” if these individuals from the farming 
population can be called as such, are mostly a high school diploma, which is the ‘minimum 
eligibility requirement’ for appointment to the post. During the foregoing period of indirect 
elections, those elected to the position of local government president with business 
backgrounds tended to have higher levels of academic attainment.  
 In this regard, the decentralization process in the rural areas, after it introduced the direct 
election system, had some effect in changing the selection process of the local elite.  
 When comparing the performance and capabilities of the newcomer presidents with those of 
their predecessors, we observe some impediments to their action in the former’s capabilities 
to construct networks and find resources to resolve problems in rural LAOs.  In contrast to 
their predecessors with business backgrounds, most newcomers lack access to political and 
administrative networks useful for obtaining resources. In addition, the newcomers’ choices 
of strategies for resolving problems have differed in several ways from those available to their 
predecessors who were appointed through indirect elections. Presidents appointed by indirect 
elections, in their role as regional bosses, were able to cultivate useful contacts through 
personal political and administrative networks. Moreover, they could frequently obtain the 
necessary resources through these networks when there was a shortage of funds to cover 
17 
 
budgetary expenditure. Thus, there seems to be not only a need for intervention by the central 
authorities, who control the system by which local government presidents are elected, but also 
one to construct a system that emphasizes a more accessible way of conducting local 
administration. 
 Concerning the policy-related implications of this research for the newcomers, the deficiency 
of network resources needed to conduct administrative work should be rectified. Moreover, 
improvements should be made in their access to external sources of support, especially in the 
small rural LAOs lacking necessary resources to conduct local administration.  
 
Notes: 
1. Probably the foremost example of administrative 
supervision is the insistence of the Thai authorities on an acceptable level of 
educational attainment. Thus, the qualification for entry as a candidate for election as a 
tambon leader is a high school diploma, while that for candidates entering elections as 
a leader of a teseban and/or prefectural government head is a university degree is 
deemed essential. To the best of the author’s knowledge, among the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, only Thailand and Indonesia insist 
on educational qualifications in the case of candidates entering local government 
elections. 
2. Concerning the educational backgrounds of local 
government presidents, exceptions could be made with respect to candidates with late 
and intermediate school qualifications. Exceptions were made with respect to those 
who had previous administrative experience of a relevant kind. Thus, those who had 
local government experience during the foregoing period of direct elections as tambon 
council members and/or as council chairmen, or with experience as officials familiar 
with the work of local government administration were allowed to present themselves 
as candidates for election to the post of local government president. In such cases, late 
and intermediate school experience was accepted, and for former tambon leaders who 
wished to be candidates in local government presidential elections, instead of degree 
qualifications, high school leaving certificates were deemed sufficient. 
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3. The budgetary funds distributed to local governments 
are divided into various categories. Among these, the categories of general aid funds 
and government allocation funds reflect the population size of the local government 
area concerned and its economic level. Grants-in-aid are made with respect to 
administrative costs and local development planning. The overall framework of the 
budget allocation is determined by the Local Government Decentralization Committee, 
which also carries out in conjunction with members of parliament an assessment of 
how much money to give local governments in the form of planning subsidies. 
However, in the final stages, when it has to be finally decided how much to give and 
to whom, and whether upward or downward adjustment should be made, the Local 
Government Promotion Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior negotiates with the 
Local Government Decentralization Committee to arrive at a final settlement. Thus, it 
can be seen that the execution of much of local government business requires a better 
than average ability to negotiate, especially with council members and central 
administrative officials. 
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